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We study two allocation models. In the ﬁrst model, we consider the problem of
allocating an inﬁnitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped pref-
erences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the ﬁrst one, we study the
allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Our main result is the char-
acterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation
rules. Alternatively, this class of rules, which largely consists of serially dictato-
rialcomponents, can be characterized by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and
weak non-bossiness (in terms of welfare). Furthermore, we study properties of fair-
ness such as anonymity and no-envy. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation
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1. INTRODUCTION
In many economic and political situations the preferences of the agents
involved are private information. Depending on the decision mechanism to
be used, agents may have an incentive to strategically misrepresent their
preferences in order to inﬂuence the ﬁnaloutcome to their own advantage,
probably at the expense of others. Misrepresentation of preferences can
be avoided by imposing strategy-proofness on the mechanism. A decision
mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent ever can gain by misrepresenting his
preferences, irrespective of the preferences announced by the other agents.
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We consider problems of allocating a private commodity among a group
of agents. The literature on strategy-proofness for private goods economies,
similar to the general literature on strategy-proofness (Gibbard (1973) and
Satterthwaite (1975)), starts off with an impossibility result. For two-agent
two-goods exchange economies, Hurwicz (1972) showed that even for a
restricted domain that contains all translated Cobb–Douglas preferences,
essentially no allocation mechanism satisﬁes strategy-proofness and Pareto
optimality. This incompatibility does not occur on certain restricted
domains; the domain of single-peaked preferences is a well-known
example.
In this paper we consider two allocation models. In the ﬁrst model we
deal with the problem of allocating some perfectly divisible commodity
among a group of agents with so-called “single-dipped” preferences: pref-
erences are single-dipped if alternatives can be ordered in such a way that
every agent has a single worst alternative, his dip, and his welfare increases
monotonically in either direction away from his dip. For example, consider
two types of work which have negative cross-effects like, perhaps, teaching
and management in a university: combinations of the two types of work
may be less preferred than pure one-type tasks.
Other examples can be derived from two-goods exchange economies with
either ﬁxed prices and strictly quasi-convex utility functions or non-convex
budget sets and classical economic preferences. In both situations, induced
single-dipped preferences on the budget boundary result. The domain
of single-dipped preferences in a public goods context was ﬁrst consid-
ered by Vickrey (1960). Inada (1964) studies single-dipped preferences
over triples of alternatives and Peremans and Storcken (1997) consider
the problem of locating a public facility with strongly negative exter-
nalities which induce single-dipped preferences on the set of admissible
locations.
In the second model, we consider the allocation of an indivisible object,
for instance a job or a prize, among a group of agents. Since there are
only two possible outcomes for each agent, individual preferences can be
interpreted as degenerate single-dipped preferences. Hence, the problem
of assigning an indivisible object to a set of agents is embedded in the
allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. Most results we derive
for the allocation of an inﬁnitely divisible commodity are easily “translated”
to the assignment problem.
Our main result (for both models) is a characterization of the class
of rules that satisfy Pareto optimality and coalitional strategy-proofness
(see Theorem 1 and Corollary 2): the main characteristic of any of those
rules is that the whole amount of the commodity is assigned to a single
agent and the rule consists for the largest part of serially dictatorial compo-
nents. An alternative characterization is obtained by weakening coalitional66 bettina klaus
strategy-proofness to strategy-proofness plus a weak non-bossiness condition1
(see Theorem 1 and Corollary 2). Furthermore, it turns out that one of
our most important properties, namely Pareto optimality, is not compatible
with properties of fairness such as anonymity and no-envy.
Klaus et al. (1997) and Klaus (1998) provide similar characterizations
involving solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-
monotonicity) and consistency properties (consistency and separability).
Recently, Ehlers (1998) extended the model we discuss here by allowing
for probabilistic allocation rules. It is noteworthy that in a “probabilistic
world” some of the incompatibilities we establish do not occur.
In a recent paper, P´ apai (1998) characterizes the set of serialdictatorship
rules for an assignment model that is similar to the one we study. On
the domain of strict preferences, P´ apai (1998) independently derives two
characterizations of serial dictatorships that correspond to our Corollary 2.
Apart from an alternative proof technique, our results (Corollary 2) show
the effect of dropping the standard requirement that preferences are strict
in this kind of assignment situation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the alloca-
tion modelwith singl e-dipped preferences and the main properties Pareto
optimality and (coalitional) strategy-proofness. In Section 3, we discuss
compatibilities and incompatibilities of Pareto optimality and (coalitional)
strategy-proofness with other well-known properties. The main compati-
bility result is the characterization of all Pareto optimal and coalitional
strategy-proof rules (Theorem 1). In Section 4, we show how compatibility
and incompatibility results derived in Section 3 extend to the allocation of
an indivisible object.
2. THE MODEL
Let   ∈ + be the amount of an inﬁnitely divisible commodity, or the
(social) endowment, that has to be distributed among a non-empty and ﬁnite
set N of agents. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a “single-dipped” prefer-
ence relation Ri deﬁned over the closed interval  0   . Single-dippedness of
Ri means that there exists a point d Ri ∈  0   , called the dip of agent i,
with the following property: for all x  y ∈  0    with x<y≤ d Ri  or
x>y≥ d Ri  we have xPiy. As usual, xRiy is interpreted as “x is weakly
preferred to y,” and xPiy as “x is strictly preferred to y.” Furthermore,
xIiy means that agent i is indifferent between x and y. Without loss of
1A rule is weakly non-bossy (in terms of welfare), if no agent can inﬂuence some other
agent’s welfare without affecting his own allotment.single-dippedness and indivisible objects 67
generality, we assume that the agents’ preference relations are continuous
as well.
By  we denote the class of all continuous and single-dipped preference
relations over  0   .L e tR =  Ri i∈N ∈ N be a (preference) proﬁle. Since
the set of agents and the endowment are ﬁxed we simply designate an econ-
omy by a proﬁle of preference relations. Thus, the class of all economies
equals N.2
Let X =  χi i∈N denote the set of unit vectors in N, where χi
j = 1i f
j = i and χi
j = 0i fj  = i.L e t X =   χi i∈N. Then, a feasible allocation for
R ∈ N is a nonnegative point x ∈ N
+ such that
 
N xi =  .A nallocation
rule ϕ,o rarule for short, is a function that assigns to every R ∈ N a
feasible allocation, denoted ϕ R . Given i ∈ N, we call ϕi R  the allotment
of agent i.
We are interested in rules that assign Pareto optimal allocations: an allo-
cation assigned by the rule cannot be changed in a way that no agent is
worse off and some agent is better off.
Pareto Optimality. For all R ∈ N, there is no feasible allocation x ∈ N
+
such that for all i ∈ N  xiRiϕi R , and for some j ∈ N  xjPjϕj R .
A weaker notion of Pareto optimality is the following weak Pareto opti-
mality: an allocation assigned by the rule cannot be changed in a way that
all agents are better off.
Weak Pareto Optimality. For all R ∈ N, there is no feasible allocation
x ∈ N
+ such that for all i ∈ N  xiPiϕi R .
First, we present a simple description of Pareto optimality for our model.
For this description we introduce the following “partition” of the agents.
For an economy R ∈ N denote the set of agents who strictly prefer  
to 0 by N  R =  i ∈ N    Pi0 , the set of agents who are indifferent
between 0 and   by N0   R =  i ∈ N   0Ii  , and the set of agents who
strictly prefer 0 to   by N0 R =  i ∈ N   0Pi  .
Hence, for all R ∈ N, N = N  R ∪N0   R ∪N0 R  and the sets
N  R , N0   R , and N0 R  are pairwise disjoint. However, since some of
the sets N  R , N0   R , and N0 R  are possibly empty, strictly speaking,
 N  R  N 0   R  N 0 R   may not constitute a partition.
Lemma 1. A rule ϕ is Pareto optimal if and only if for all R ∈ N the
following holds.
2In Klaus (1998) we consider variations of the population as well as variations of the
endowment.68 bettina klaus
FIG. 1. Pareto optimalshares as described in Lemma 1. (a) Lemma 1, Case 1: N  R   =∅ .
Necessary conditions for Pareto optimality of allotments for agents i j ∈ N  R  x i x j, are:
xi ∈  0 ∪  a    and xj ∈  0   . (b) Lemma 1, Case 3: N0 R =N. Necessary conditions
for Pareto optimality of allotments for agents k l ∈ N0 R  y k y l, are: yk ∈  0 b ∪     and
yl ∈  0   .
Case 1. If N  R   =∅ , then
for all i  ∈ N  R , ϕi R =0 and
for all i ∈ N  R , either ϕi R =0o rϕi R Pi0.3
Case 2. If N  R =∅and N0   R   =∅ , then
for some j ∈ N0   R , ϕ R = χj.
Case 3. If N0 R =N, then
for all i ∈ N, either ϕi R =  or ϕi R Pi .4
Proof. See Appendix. 
Next, in addition to Pareto optimality, we are interested in strategy-
proofness. Strategy-proofness states that no agent ever beneﬁts from misrep-
resenting his preferences. In game theoretical terms, an allocation rule is
strategy-proof if in its associated direct revelation game form, it is a weakly
dominant strategy for each agent to announce his true preference relation.
Before we give the formaldeﬁnition, we introduce some notation.
For R ∈ N, i ∈ N, and   Ri ∈ ,    Ri R −i  denotes the proﬁle obtained
from R by replacing Ri by   Ri. We call   R =   Ri R −i  an i-deviation from R.
3See Fig. 1a.
4See Fig. 1b.single-dippedness and indivisible objects 69
Strategy-Proofness. For all R    R ∈ N and all j ∈ N,i f  R is a j-deviation
from R, then ϕj R Rjϕj   R .
A strengthening of strategy-proofness is the following coalitional strategy-
proofness: no group, or coalition, of agents can ever beneﬁt from misrepre-
senting their preferences.
Let M ⊆ N.F o rR ∈ N the restriction  Ri i∈M ∈ M of R to M is
denoted by RM.L e tC ⊆ N. Then, N\C =  i ∈ N   i  ∈ C .
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness. For all R ∈ N and all C ⊆ N there
exists no   R ∈ N with   RN\C = RN\C such that for all i ∈ C, ϕi   R Riϕi R 
and for some j ∈ C ϕj   R Pjϕj R .
3. COMPATIBILITIES AND INCOMPATIBILITIES
In this section, we study the compatibility of Pareto optimality and strategy-
proofness with other well-known properties for rules. The following example
shows that the class of Pareto optimal and strategy-proof rules also contains
“erratic” rules, i.e., rules that rely on information that we do not consider
as crucialfor the probl em at hand.
Example 1. In this example we assign the whole endowment   to a
single agent. The choice of the agent who receives   depends on whether
the dip of agent 1 is a rational or an irrational number. The following rule ˜ ϕ
satisﬁes Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness. Without loss of generality,
we deﬁne ˜ ϕ R  for N =  1 2 3 .L e tR ∈ N.
Case 1. N  R   =∅ .I fN  R =  i , then ˜ ϕ R = χi.I f N  R   > 1,
then




 χ1 if  P10,
 χ2 if 0R1  and d R1 ∈
 χ3 if 0R1  and d R1   ∈ 
(1)
Case 2. N  R =∅and N0   R   =∅ . Then ˜ ϕ R = χi for some i ∈
N0   R .
Case 3. N = N0 R . Then
˜ ϕ R =
 
 χ2 if d R1 ∈
 χ3 if d R1   ∈ .
(2)
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For an example of a rule that satisﬁes Pareto optimality and strategy-
proofness but that does not always assign the whole endowment to a single
agent, we refer to Example 6.
In the remainder of this section, we add various additionalproperties
and study how this narrows down the class of Pareto optimal and strategy-
proof rules.
Non-Bossiness and Coalitional Strategy-Proofness
In Example 1 we described a rule that in some situations assigns the
whole endowment in a so-called “bossy” way, i.e., by unilaterally changing
his preference relation, one of the agents can inﬂuence the allotments of
the other agents even though his allotment remains the same. Hence, he
can manipulate the allotments of the remaining agents without changing
his own allotment. A rule that does not allow for this kind of manipula-
tion is called non-bossy. This concept of (non-)bossiness was introduced by
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).
We think that in an allocation model that allows agents to be indiffer-
ent among different allotments, this original notion of non-bossiness is too
strong because even though the allotments of some agents might change,
it might be the case that all allotments remain the same in terms of wel-
fare. We therefore consider two weaker versions of the originalproperty of
non-bossiness. First we consider non-bossiness in terms of welfare: no agent
can inﬂuence some other agent’s welfare without affecting his own welfare.
Non-bossiness (in terms of welfare). For all R    R ∈ N and all j ∈ N,
if   R is a j-deviation from R and ϕj R Ijϕj   R , then for all i ∈ N\ j ,
ϕi R Iiϕi   R .
In the sequelwe use the shorter phrase of non-bossiness for non-bossiness
in terms of welfare.
As we will see later (Example 2), Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness,
and non-bossiness are incompatible. However, the following slightly weaker
version of non-bossiness turns out to be compatible with Pareto optimality
and strategy-proofness. Weak non-bossiness in terms of welfare states that no
agent can inﬂuence some other agent’s welfare without affecting his own
allotment.
Weak non-bossiness (in terms of welfare). For all R    R ∈ N and all j ∈
N,i f  R is a j-deviation from R and ϕj R =ϕj   R , then for all i ∈ N\ j ,
ϕi R Iiϕi   R .
In the sequelwe use the shorter phrase of weak non-bossiness for weak
non-bossiness in terms of welfare.
Next, we not only show that the class of rules satisfying Pareto optimality,
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and coalitionally strategy-proof rules, but we also characterize the whole
class of rules. In order to satisfy all properties mentioned above, the whole
endowment is assigned to a single agent. The selection of this agent can be
described as follows.
We ﬁx a linear order of the set of agents and ask the agent who is ﬁrst
in this order whether he prefers   to 0. If he prefers the whole endow-
ment, he receives it and we are done. If not, we ask the second agent the
same question, and so on. Hence, the ﬁrst agent according to the ﬁxed
order who prefers the whole endowment to nothing receives it. If no agent
strictly prefers   to 0 and at least one agent is indifferent between 0 and
 , then the endowment can be assigned “arbitrarily” to any of the indif-
ferent agents. If all agents strictly prefer 0 to  , there exists a preselected
agent who receives  . Loosely speaking, there is a “scapegoat” who always
receives the whole endowment when nobody else wants it.
For a formaldescription, we introduce additionalnotation.
A permutation π on N is a bijective function π   N → N.B y N we
denote the set of all permutations on N. Since for π ∈  N and i ∈ N,
π i  can also be interpreted as the position of i in a linear order on N,
we alternatively refer to π as the linear order on N.B yGN we denote
the set of choice functions g   N → N such that g R ∈N0   R  if
N0   R   =∅ .
Selection fπ g k. Let π ∈  N, g ∈ GN, and k ∈ N. Then the selection
fπ g k   N → N (based on π, g, and k) is deﬁned as follows. Let R ∈ N.
Case 1. If N  R   =∅ , then fπ g k R =argmin π i  i ∈ N  R  .
Case 2. If N  R =∅and N0   R   =∅ , then fπ g k R =g R .
Case 3. If N = N0 R , then fπ g k R =k.
Note that in Case 1 the selection rule equals a serial-dictatorship. Also
Case 3 can be interpreted as (degenerated) serially dictatorial.
Theorem 1. Let ϕ be a rule. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality and coalitional strategy-proofness.
(ii) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-
bossiness.
(iii) There exist π ∈  N, g ∈ GN, and k ∈ N such that for all R ∈ N,
ϕ R = χfπ g k R   (3)72 bettina klaus
Since on the domain of two-agent economies each Pareto optimal rule
satisﬁes weak non-bossiness, and coalitional strategy-proofness simply boils
down to strategy-proofness, Theorem 1 implies the following.
Corollary 1. Let  N =2. Then a rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality and
strategy-proofness if and only if there exist π ∈  N, g ∈ GN, and k ∈ N such
that for all R ∈ N,
ϕ R = χfπ g k R   (4)
We divide the proof of Theorem 1 in the following steps.
First, we show that coalitional strategy-proofness implies weak non-
bossiness (Lemma 2). Then, we prove that a rule that satisﬁes Pareto
optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness assigns the whole
endowment to a single agent (Lemma 3). Next, we show that Pareto
optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness imply coalitional
strategy-proofness (Lemma 4). Finally, we ﬁnish the proof by identifying the
class of Pareto optimal and coalitional strategy-proof (strategy-proof and weak
non-bossy) rules with the class of “serial-dictatorship” rules as described in
Theorem 1 (iii).
Lemma 2. Let ϕ be a rule that satisﬁes coalitional strategy-proofness. Then
ϕ satisﬁes weak non-bossiness.
Proof. Let ϕ be coalitionally strategy-proof.L e tR ∈ N and consider
a j-deviation   R from R such that ϕj R =ϕj   R . Hence, ϕj R Ijϕj   R 
and ϕj R   Ijϕj   R . In order to prove weak non-bossiness we assume,
by contradiction, that there exists an agent k  = j such that either
(a) ϕk   R Pkϕk R  or (b) ϕk R Pkϕk   R .
(a) Then,   RN\ j k  = RN\ j k , ϕj   R Ijϕj R , and ϕk   R Pkϕk R  con-
tradict coalitional strategy-proofness.
(b) Note that ϕk R   Pkϕk   R . Then, RN\ j k =  RN\ j k , ϕj R   Ijϕj   R ,
and ϕk R   Pkϕk   R  contradict coalitional strategy-proofness. 
Next, we show that a rule ϕ that satisﬁes Pareto optimality, strategy-
proofness, and weak non-bossiness assigns the whole endowment to a
single agent.
Let ϕ =  R ∈ N   ϕ R   ∈  XN  be the set of economies that yields a
broken allocation under ϕ, i.e., a feasible allocation where no agent obtains
the whole endowment.
Lemma 3. Let ϕ be a rule that satisﬁes Pareto optimality, strategy-
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Proof. Let ϕ satisfy the properties listed in the lemma and suppose by
contradiction that ϕ  =∅ .
Given R ∈ ϕ,le t Bϕ R  denote the set of agents with broken allotments
at ϕ R , i.e., Bϕ R =  i ∈ N   ϕi R   ∈  0    . Since ϕ  =∅and N is
ﬁnite, there exists a proﬁle R ∈ ϕ with a minimalnumber of agents who
have a broken allotment. So, let R ∈ N be such that ϕ R   ∈  XN and
for all   R ∈ ϕ,  Bϕ   R   ≥  Bϕ R  . Hence, Bϕ R   =∅and, by Lemma 1,
either (a) for all i ∈ Bϕ R , ϕi R Pi0o r(b) for all i ∈ Bϕ R , ϕi R Pi .
Hence, either (a) Bϕ R ⊆N  R  or (b) Bϕ R ⊆N0 R .
(a) Bϕ R ⊆N  R . First, we show that, without loss of generality,
we can assume that Bϕ R =N  R .
(a.1) Suppose that Bϕ R N  R .L e ti ∈ N  R  and i  ∈ Bϕ R . So,
ϕi R =0.
Let R1 ∈ N be an i-deviation from R such that R1
i ∈ N0 R1 . Hence,
by Lemma 1, ϕi R1 =0. Since ϕi R1 =ϕi R =0, by weak non-
bossiness, for all j ∈ N\ i , ϕj R1 Ijϕj R . Thus, by Lemma 1, for all
j ∈ N\ i , ϕj R1 =ϕj R . Hence, Bϕ R1 =Bϕ R , Bϕ R1 ⊆N  R1  
and  N  R1   =  N  R   − 1.
Next, suppose that Bϕ R1 N  R1 .L e ti ∈ N  R1  and i  ∈ Bϕ R1 .
Let R2 ∈ N be an i-deviation from R1 such that R2
i ∈ N0 R2 . Then,
as before, it follows that Bϕ R2 =Bϕ R1 , Bϕ R2 ⊆N  R2   and
 N  R2   =  N  R1   − 1.
Since the set of agents N is ﬁnite, repeating the preceding steps, we
ﬁnally end up with a proﬁle ˜ R ∈ N such that Bϕ  ˜ R =Bϕ R  and Bϕ  ˜ R =
N   ˜ R . Hence, it is without loss of generality to assume Bϕ R =N  R 
in the remainder of the proof.
(a.2) Let Bϕ R =N  R .L e ti ∈ Bϕ R =N  R . First, consider an
i-deviation R1 from R such that  P1
i 0P1
i ϕi R . Note that N  R1 =N  R .
By strategy-proofness for the i-deviation R1 from R, ϕj R Rjϕj R1 . Hence,
since i ∈ N  R , ϕi R1 ≤ϕi R .B yN  R1 =N  R  and Lemma 1, it
follows that either ϕi R1 =0o rϕi R1 P1
i 0. The latter can only be true
if ϕi R1  >ϕ i R , which contradicts strategy-proofness. Hence, ϕi R1 =
0. Because the number of agents in Bϕ R  is minimalfor R ∈ ϕ and
Bϕ R1 =N  R1 , it follows that R1  ∈ ϕ. Hence, by Lemma 1, there
exists j ∈ Bϕ R1 \ i =N  R1 \ i  such that ϕ R1 = χj.
Next, consider a j-deviation R2 from R1 such that  P2
j 0P2
j ϕj R .
Hence, N  R2 =N  R1  and strategy-proofness for the j-deviation R2
from R1 implies ϕ R2 = χj.
Suppose there exists k ∈ Bϕ R \ i j . Then, consider a k-deviation
R3 from R2 such that  P3
k0P3
kϕk R . Since ϕk R2 =0, strategy-proofness
for the k-deviation R3 from R2 implies ϕk R3 =0. Thus, by weak non-74 bettina klaus
bossiness and Lemma 1, ϕ R3 = χj. Next, suppose that there exists l ∈
Bϕ R \ i j k . Then, as before, it follows that for any l-deviation R4 from
R3 such that  P4
l 0P4
l ϕl R , ϕ R4 = χj, etc.
Hence, after  Bϕ R   steps, we obtain a proﬁle ˜ R ∈ N such that
N   ˜ R =Bϕ R , for all m  ∈ N   ˜ R , ˜ Rm = Rm, and for all m ∈ N   ˜ R ,
  ˜ Pm0 ˜ Pmϕm R . Furthermore, ϕ  ˜ R = χj, and in particular ϕi  ˜ R =0.
Since i ∈ Bϕ R  was arbitrarily chosen, we can construct proﬁle ˜ R
proceeding from any j ∈ Bϕ R . Hence, for all j ∈ Bϕ R , ϕj  ˜ R =0. Since
N   ˜ R =Bϕ R  this contradicts Pareto optimality.
(b) Bϕ R ⊆N0 R .L e ti ∈ Bϕ R  and consider an i-deviation R1
from R such that 0P1
i  P1
i ϕi R .B ystrategy-proofness for the i-deviation
R1 from R, ϕj R Rjϕj R1 . Hence, since i ∈ N0 R , ϕi R1 ≥ϕi R .B y
N0 R1 =N0 R =N and Lemma 1, it follows that either ϕi R1 =  or
ϕi R1 P1
i  . The latter can only be true if ϕi R1  <ϕ i R , which contradicts
strategy-proofness. Hence, ϕ R1 = χi.
Next, let j ∈ Bϕ R \ i  and consider a j-deviation R2 from R1
such that 0P2
j  P2
j ϕj R . Since, ϕj R1 =0, strategy-proofness for the j-
deviation R2 from R1 implies ϕj R2 =0. Thus, by weak non-bossiness and
Lemma 1, ϕ R2 = χi. Next, suppose that there exists k ∈ Bϕ R \ i j .
Then, as before, it follows that for any k-deviation R3 from R2 such that
0P3
k P3
kϕk R , ϕ R3 = χi, etc.
Hence, after  Bϕ R   steps, we obtain a proﬁle ˜ R ∈ N such that for
all m  ∈ Bϕ R , ˜ Rm = Rm and for all m ∈ Bϕ R ,0˜ Pm  ˜ Pmϕm R . Further-
more, ϕ  ˜ R = χi.
Since i ∈ Bϕ R  was arbitrarily chosen, we can construct proﬁle ˜ R
proceeding from any j ∈ Bϕ R . Hence, for all j ∈ Bϕ R \ i , ϕ  ˜ R = χj.
This contradicts ϕ  ˜ R = χi. 
Using Lemma 3 we can easily show the incompatibility of non-bossiness
with Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.
Example 2. Let N =  1 2 ,   = 1 and consider a Pareto optimal,
strategy-proof, and non-bossy rule ϕ.L e tR =  R1 R 2 ∈N be such that
0P11 and 0P21. By Lemma 3, ϕ R =χk, k ∈ N0 R =N. Assume, with-
out loss of generality, that ϕ R =χ2. Now, consider a 1-deviation ˜ R from
R such that 0˜ I11. Then, by Pareto optimality, ϕ R =χ1. Hence, for the 1-
deviation R from ˜ R, ϕ1 R ˜ I1ϕ1  ˜ R . Then, by non-bossiness, ϕ2  ˜ R ˜ I2ϕ2 R .
However, ϕ2 R =1, ϕ2  ˜ R =0, and ϕ2  ˜ R P2ϕ2 R . Since R2 = ˜ R2, this
is in contradiction to ϕ2  ˜ R ˜ I2ϕ2 R   ♦
Next, we prove that Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-
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Lemma 4. Let ϕ be a rule that satisﬁes Pareto optimality, strategy-
proofness, and weak non-bossiness. Then ϕ satisﬁes coalitional strategy-
proofness.
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy the properties listed in the lemma and suppose
by contradiction that ϕ is not coalitionally strategy-proof. Then there exist
R,   R ∈ N with   RN\C = RN\C and C ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ C,
ϕi   R Riϕi R  and for some j ∈ C, ϕj   R Pjϕj R .B ystrategy-proofness,
 C  > 1. Let c =  C , C =  i1     i c , and j = ic.
Case 1. N  R   =∅ .
By Lemma 3, there exists k ∈ N such that ϕ R = χk. Hence, j k ∈
N  R , k  ∈ C, and ϕ   R = χj.
First, we show that it is without loss of generality to assume that for all
l ∈ C\ j , l  ∈ N  R  and l  ∈ N    R .L e tl ∈ N  R  and consider the
l-deviation ˆ R from R with l  ∈ N   ˆ R . Then, by Lemma 3 and Pareto opti-
mality, ϕl R =ϕl  ˆ R =0. Hence, by weak non-bossiness, ϕ R =ϕ  ˆ R .
Similarly, for l ∈ N    R  and l-deviation ˜ R from   R with l  ∈ N   ˜ R , ϕ   R =
ϕ  ˜ R . Furthermore, for all i ∈ C, ϕi  ˜ R  ˆ Riϕi  ˆ R  and ϕj  ˜ R  ˆ Pjϕj  ˆ R . Repe-
tition of the preceding steps yields the desired result.
Consider the i1-deviation R1 from R with R1
i1 =   Ri1. Then, by Lemma 3
and Pareto optimality, ϕi1 R =ϕi1 R1 =0. Hence, by weak non-bossiness,
ϕ R =ϕ R1 . Next, consider the i2-deviation R2 from R1 with R2
i2 =   Ri2.
Similarly as before, it follows that ϕ R1 =ϕ R2 . Hence, ϕ R2 =ϕ R .
Applying this argument several times yields for the proﬁle Ric−1 such that
R
ic−1
N\ j  =   RN\ j  and R
ic−1
j = Rj, ϕ Ric−1 =ϕ R . Hence, ϕj Ric−1 =0.
Note that   R is a j-deviation from Ric−1.B yL e m m a3a n dstrategy-proofness,
ϕj   R =0. This is a contradiction to ϕ   R = χj.
Case 2. N  R =∅and N0   R   =∅ .
For all i ∈ N and all x ∈  0   , ϕi R Rix. Hence, there exists no j ∈ N
and no x ∈  0    such that x = ϕj   R Pj R .
Case 3. N = N0 R .
Hence, ϕ R = χj and there exists k  ∈ C such that ϕ   R = χk. Since
k ∈ N0   R ,b yPareto optimality, N = N0   R .
Consider the i1-deviation R1 from R with R1
i1 =   Ri1. Then, by Lemma 3
and strategy-proofness, ϕi1 R =ϕi1 R1 =0. Hence, by weak non-bossiness,
ϕ R =ϕ R1 . Next, consider the i2 -deviation R2 from R1 with R2
i2 =   Ri2.
Similarly as before, it follows that ϕ R1 =ϕ R2 . Hence, ϕ R2 =ϕ R .
Applying this argument several times yields for the proﬁle Ric−1 such that
R
ic−1
N\ j  =   RN\ j  and R
ic−1
j = Rj, ϕ Ric−1 =ϕ R . Hence, ϕj Ric−1 = .
Note that   R is a j-deviation from Ric−1.B ystrategy-proofness, ϕj   R = .
This is a contradiction to ϕ   R = χk, k  = j. 76 bettina klaus
Finally, we complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 2, (i) implies (ii). By Lemma 4, (ii)
implies (i). It is easy, but tedious, to prove that a rule as described in
(iii) satisﬁes Pareto optimality, coalitional strategy-proofness, and therefore
strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness. It remains to prove that either
(i) implies (iii)o r( ii) implies (iii). We prove that (i) implies (iii).
By Lemmas 3 and 4, it follows that ϕ =∅ . Hence, for all R ∈ N,
ϕ R = χi for some i ∈ N.
(a) Deﬁnition of π ∈  N.
(a.1) Let R ∈ N be such that N  R =N. Then, ϕ R = χi1 for
some i1 ∈ N. Set π i1 =1. By coalitional strategy-proofness, for all   R ∈ N
with i1 ∈ N    R ⊆N,
ϕ   R = χi1  (5)
(a.2) Next, let R ∈ N be such that N  R =N1  = N\ i1 . Then,
ϕ R = χi2 for some i2 ∈ N1. Set π i2 =2. By coalitional strategy-
proofness, for all   R ∈ N with i2 ∈ N    R ⊆N1,
ϕ   R = χi2  (6)
(a.3) Let R ∈ N be such that N  R =N2  = N1\ i2 . Then
ϕ R = χi3 for some i3 ∈ N2. Set π i3 =3, etc.
It is now clear how the linear order π ∈  N is constructed step by step
by leaving out the agent receiving the whole endowment. By the deﬁnition
of π, it follows that for all R ∈ N such that N  R   =∅ ,
ϕ R = χargmin π i  i∈N  R    (7)
(b) Deﬁnition of g   N → N.
Deﬁne a choice function g   N → N as follows. For all R ∈ N,




i if ϕ R = χi and N  R =∅ ,
min i   i ∈ N0   R   if N  R   =∅and N0   R   =∅ ,
min i   i ∈ N  R   if N  R   =∅and N0   R =∅ .
Hence, by the deﬁnition of g, it follows that for all R ∈ N such that
N  R =∅and N0   R   =∅ ,
ϕ R = χg R   (8)
Note, that the choice function g is not uniquely determined: (8) holds for
all choice functions ¯ g   N → N such that ¯ g R =i if ϕ R = χi and
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(c) Deﬁnition of k ∈ N.
Let R ∈ N be such that N0 R =N. Then, ϕ R = χi for some i ∈ N.
By coalitional strategy-proofness, it follows for all   R ∈ N with N0   R =N,
ϕ   R = χi.
Hence, by setting k = i, for all R ∈ N with N0 R =N,
ϕ R = χk  (9)
Now, Eqs. (7), (8), and (9) imply that for all R∈N ϕ R = χfπ g k R . 
Remark 1. As shown in Klaus et al. (1997) the class of rules described
in Theorem 1 equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto optimality, strategy-
proofness, and the solidarity property “replacement-domination.” The lat-
ter property requires that if an agent’s preference relation is “replaced”
by some other admissible preference relation, then this unilateral change
affects the remaining agents in the same direction, i.e., these agents all
(weakly) gain or they all (weakly) lose.
In the next example, we describe a rule that satisﬁes all properties stated
in Theorem 1.
Example 3. The following rule ϕmin satisﬁes Pareto optimality, coali-
tional strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness. For all R ∈ N:
Case 1. If N  R   =∅ , then ϕmin R = χmin i i∈N  R  .
Case 2. If N  R =∅and N0   R   =∅   then ϕmin R =
 χmin i i∈N0   R  .
Case 3. If N = N0 R , then ϕmin R = χmin i i∈N0 R  .
By id ∈  N we denote the identity permutation deﬁned by id i =i for
all i ∈ N.L e tπ = id and deﬁne gmin ∈ GN such that for all R ∈ N,
gmin R =min i   i ∈ N0   R   if N0   R   =∅and gN
min R =min i  
i ∈ N  otherwise. Furthermore, let kmin = min i   i ∈ N . Then, for all
R ∈ N, ϕmin R = χfid gmin kmin R   ♦
The following examples show that the characterization given in
Theorem 1 is tight, i.e., dropping any of the properties yields alterna-
tive rules.
Example 4. The following rule ¯ ϕ satisﬁes (coalitional) strategy-proofness
and weak non-bossiness, but not Pareto optimality. For all R ∈ N, ¯ ϕ R =
 χmin i i∈N   ♦
Example 5. The following rule ˆ ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality and weak
non-bossiness, but not (coalitional) strategy-proofness. For all R ∈ N such
that N  R   =∅ ,le t N1
  R =  i ∈ N  R  d Ri =0  and N2
  R =  i ∈
N  R  d Ri   = 0 . Then, for all R ∈ N, we deﬁne ˆ ϕ R  as follows. If
N1
  R   =∅ , then ˆ ϕ R = χmin i i∈N1
  R  ,i fN1
  R =∅and N2
  R   =∅ ,
then ˆ ϕ R = χmin i i∈N2
  R  , and ˆ ϕ R =ϕmin R  otherwise. ♦78 bettina klaus
Example 6. The following rule ˜ ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality and strategy-
proofness, but neither weak non-bossiness nor coalitional strategy-proofness.
Without loss of generality, we deﬁne ˜ ϕ R  for N =  1 2 3 , R ∈ N.I f
 P30, then
˜ ϕ R =
 
 1
2   1
2  0  if  P1
1
2 P10 and  P2
1
2 P20,
 0 0    otherwise.
(10)
For all remaining R ∈ N, ˜ ϕ R =ϕmin R   ♦
Incompatibilities
Note that in all examples demonstrating incompatibilities Pareto optimal-
ity can easily be replaced by weak Pareto optimality.
We consider the compatibility of Pareto optimality with various fairness
properties: anonymity, no-envy, and equal treatment of equals.5
Anonymity requires that the agents’ allotments do not depend on their
names. No-envy states that no agent strictly prefers the allotment of another
agent to his own allotment. Equal treatment of equals, a weakening of
no-envy and of anonymity, requires that if two agents have the same prefer-
ence relations, then each of them is indifferent between his allotment and
the other agent’s allotment.
Let π ∈  N be a permutation on N and R ∈ N. Then, by Rπ we mean
 Rπ i  i∈N.
Anonymity. For all R ∈ N,a ll π ∈  N, and all i ∈ N, ϕi Rπ =
ϕπ i  R .
No-Envy. For all R ∈ N, and all i j ∈ N, ϕi R Riϕj R .
Equal Treatment of Equals. For all R ∈ N, and all i j ∈ N,i fRi = Rj,
then ϕi R Iiϕj R .
By the next example, we show that Pareto optimality is generally not com-
patible with the fairness properties introduced above.
Example 7. Let N =  1 2 ,   = 1, and R ∈ N be such that
R1 = R2 and d R1 =0 7, 0I10 9, and 0 2I10 8. Suppose the rule
ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality. Then, by Lemma 1, for i = 1 2, either
ϕi R =0o rϕi R ∈  0 9 1 . Since ϕ2 R =1 − ϕ1 R , it follows,
by feasibility, that ϕ R ∈    1 0   0 1  .I fϕ is anonymous, then
ϕ R =  0 5 0 5 .I fϕ satisﬁes no-envy or equal treatment of equals,
then ϕ R ∈    0 5 0 5   0 2 0 8   0 8 0 2  . However, none of these
allocations is Pareto optimal. ♦
5For an analysis of these properties for the problem of fair allocation when preferences are
single-peaked, we refer to Ching (1992, 1994) and Sprumont (1991).single-dippedness and indivisible objects 79
The next example shows that Pareto optimality and continuity with respect
to preferences are not compatible. In the example we apply continuity with
respect to preferences in an informalway: continuous changes of the prefer-
ences imply continuous changes in the allocations assigned by the rule. For
the problem of fair allocation when preferences are single-peaked, continu-
ity with respect to preferences was introduced by Sprumont (1991). This def-
inition can easily be adjusted for rules when preferences are single-dipped.
Example 8. Let N =  1 2 ,   = 1, and R =  R1 R 2 ∈N be
such that 0I11 and 1P20. Suppose the rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimal-
ity. Then, ϕ R =  0 1 . Now, change R2 continuously into R1 in such
a way that in these changes agent 1 still prefers 1 to 0. Continuity with
respect to preferences implies (in the limit) ϕ R1 R 1 =  0 1 . Next, con-
sider   R =  R2 R 1 ∈N. Then, by the same argument, it follows that
ϕ   R =  1 0  and (in the limit) ϕ R1 R 1 =  1 0 . This is in contradiction
to ϕ R1 R 1 =  0 1   ♦
4. THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN INDIVISIBLE OBJECT
Consider the well-known problem of allocating an indivisible object
among a group of agents, e.g., a task or a realobject. Obviousl y, this
problem is closely related to the allocation problem with single-dipped
preferences we introduced in Section 2 (see Lemma 3).
In order to keep this section self-contained, we brieﬂy introduce the
model. An indivisible object   has to be allocated among a non-empty
and ﬁnite set N of agents. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a pref-
erence relation Ri deﬁned over the two alternatives “receiving nothing,”
denoted by 0, and “receiving the object,” denoted by  . Hence, for each
agent i ∈ N either 0Pi ,0 Ii ,o r Pi0. By  0    we denote the set of
preference relations over  0    and N
 0    denotes the set of (preference)
proﬁles R =  Ri i∈N such that for all i ∈ N, Ri ∈  0   . Thus, the class of
all economies is denoted by N
 0   .
A feasible allocation for R ∈ N
 0    is an assignment of the object   to an
agent i ∈ N; we denote this allocation by  χi. Note that it is without loss of
generality that free disposal of the commodity is not allowed. An assignment
rule ϕ is a function that assigns to every R ∈ N
 0    a feasible allocation,
denoted ϕ R . Note that either ϕi R =0o rϕi R = . Properties of
assignment rules and further notation are as deﬁned in Sections 2 and 3.
It is easy to show that Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 remain true for assign-
ment rules. Before stating this result as a corollary, we show that Pareto
optimality implies strategy-proofness.80 bettina klaus
Lemma 5. Let ϕ be an assignment rule that satisﬁes Pareto optimality.
Then ϕ satisﬁes strategy-proofness.
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy Pareto optimality and suppose by contradiction that
ϕ is not strategy-proof. Then there exist R    R ∈ N
 0    and j ∈ N such that
  R is a j-deviation from R and ϕj   R Pjϕj R . This can only occur if either
(a) j ∈ N  R , ϕj R =0, and ϕj   R =  or (b) j ∈ N0 R , ϕj R = ,
and ϕj   R =0.
(a) Since   R is a j-deviation from R and   Rj  = Rj either 0  Ij  or 0  Pj .
Since ϕj R =0, there exists k ∈ N with ϕk R = . Furthermore, by
Pareto optimality, k ∈ N  R  and k ∈ N    R . Hence, by Pareto optimality,
ϕj   R =0. This is a contradiction.
(b) Since j ∈ N0 R  and ϕj R = ,b yPareto optimality, N0 R =N.
Since   R is a j-deviation from R and   Rj  = Rj either  Ij0o r Pj0. Hence,
by Pareto optimality, ϕj   R = . This is a contradiction. 
Corollary 2. Let ϕ be an assignment rule. Then the following statements
are equivalent.
(i) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality and coalitional strategy-proofness.
(ii) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality and weak non-bossiness.
(iii) There exist π ∈  N, g ∈ GN, and k ∈ N such that for all R ∈ N,
ϕ R = χfπ g k R   (11)
The rule ϕmin as described in Example 3 is an example of an assign-
ment rule that satisﬁes all properties stated in Corollary 2. Example 4 shows
the independence of Pareto optimality from coalitional strategy-proofness and
weak non-bossiness. However, in order to prove the independence of coali-
tional strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness from Pareto optimality we
need a new example.
Example 9. The following rule ˇ ϕ satisﬁes Pareto optimality but neither
weak non-bossiness nor coalitional strategy-proofness. Without loss of gener-
ality, we deﬁne ˇ ϕ R  for N =  1 2 3 .L e tR ∈ N
 0   .I fN  R   =∅and
 N  R   > 1, then




 χ1 if  P 10,
 χ2 if 0I1 ,
 χ3 if 0P1 ,
(12)
and ˇ ϕ R =ϕmin R  otherwise. ♦single-dippedness and indivisible objects 81
Remark 2. P´ apai (1998) considers the problem of allocating an indi-
visible object where agents are not indifferent between the alternatives
“receiving nothing” and “receiving the object” and where free disposal
is allowed. For this model she proves that the class of rules that satisfy
Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness (in terms of allot-
ments) equals the class of serial dictatorships (P´ apai, 1998, Proposition
2). Furthermore, P´ apai (1998) studies the trade-off between the properties
Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness (in terms of allotments),
and non-dictatorship.
Restricting our modelto the modelof P ´ apai (1998), the class of rules
described in Corollary 2 equals the serial dictatorships described in P´ apai
(1998). The proofs of this result are different.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ϕ be a rule and let R ∈ N. It is easy to show
that all allocations described in Lemma 1 are Pareto optimal. It remains
to show that they are the only Pareto optimal allocations. Let ϕ be Pareto
optimal and let y = ϕ R .
Case 1. N  R   =∅ . Suppose, by contradiction, that   N =  i ∈ N   either
 i  ∈ N  R  and yi  = 0  or  i ∈ N  R , yi  = 0, and 0Riyi    =∅ .
Suppose that there exists an agent j ∈ N  R \  N such that yj  = 0. Then,
deﬁne the feasible allocation x as follows. For i ∈   N, xi = 0. For i  ∈   N
and i  = j, xi = yi. Finally, xj = yj +
 
i∈  N yi. The allocation x is a Pareto
improvement over y: for all i ∈ N, xiRiyi and xjPjyj.
Suppose that there exists no agent j ∈ N  R \  N such that yj  = 0. Then,
let k ∈ N  R  and x =  χk. The allocation x is a Pareto improvement
over y: for all i ∈ N, xiRiyi and xkPkyk.
Case 2. N  R =∅and N0   R   =∅ . It is easy to see that for all
j ∈ N0   R , k ∈ N0 R ,  χj Pareto dominates  χk. Now, suppose by con-
tradiction that   N =  i ∈ N   yi  ∈  0       =∅ .L e tj ∈   N.I fj ∈ N0   R ,





jPjyj.I fj ∈ N0 R , then  χk where k ∈ N0   R  is a Pareto improve-
ment over y: for all i ∈ N,  χk
i Riyi and  χk
j Pjyj.
Case 3. N0 R =N. Suppose by contradiction that   N =  i ∈ N   yi  =  
and  Riyi   =∅ .L e tj ∈   N and k ∈ N be such that yk  = 0. Then,  χj is a
Pareto improvement over y: for all i ∈ N,  χ
j
iRiyi and  χ
j
k Pkyk . 82 bettina klaus
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